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Ethnic Exclusionism in European Countries
Public Opposition to Civil Rights for Legal Migrants as a
Response to Perceived Ethnic Threat
Peer Scheepers,Me¨roveGijsberts, andMarcel Coenders
In this paper we focus on opposition among European citizens to the granting of civil rights to legal
migrants, a phenomenon considered to be a crucial aspect of ethnic exclusionism.We set out to
establish to what extent di¡erences in support of ethnic exclusionism can be explained in terms of
e¡ects of particular (a) individual and (b) contextual characteristics, and in terms of (c) interactions
between contextual and individual characteristics.We have systematically derived hypotheses from
Ethnic CompetitionTheory.We used cross-national comparable data from 15 European countries
andperformedmulti-level analyses (totalN12,728).We found that people living in individual com-
petitive conditions perceive ethnic out-groups as a threat, and that this in turn reinforces ethnic
exclusionism. Contextual competitive conditions, particularly the presence of non-EU citizens,
also a¡ect ethnic exclusionism.
Introduction
MostEuropeangovernments have put themigration
issue high on the political agenda. The migrants
themselves have also become a major public issue
in a social climate where 33 per cent of European
citizens are considered to be racist (Eurobarometer
Survey 47.1). In this contribution we will focus on
stances regarding ethnic issues by addressing a ques-
tion on a speci¢c aspect of ethnic exclusionism:
opposition to the granting of civil rights to legally
administered residentmigrants.1This issue is of par-
ticular relevance.Manyof these legally administered
migrants are entitled to stay in the host country and
have been granted a number of civil rights, formally
speaking. Many Europeans, however, do not think
of civil rights for migrants in formal terms. On the
contrary, they often oppose immigration and the
presence of migrants and, moreover, oppose grant-
ing civil rights to these migrants. Opposition to the
granting of civil rights to legal migrants implies
social exclusion of migrants, which in turn implies
social non-integration that may lead to inter-ethnic
tensions.This issue has becomewidely disseminated
throughout the public and political arenas.2
In previous research, unfavourable attitudes
towards migrants were described extensively by
Fuchs, Gerhards, and Roller (1993), Pettigrew and
Meertens (1995), and Hamberger and Hewstone
(1997), on the basis of a European poll conducted
in 1988. However, these studies focused exclusively
on the individual level, thereby neglecting country-
level explanations. Quillian (1995) set out to
explain anti-immigrant and racial prejudice by
relating it to both individual and contextual condi-
tions, a contribution that we consider to be of great
importance. In that contribution, however, the
theoretical model was under-speci¢ed in the
empirical analyses, especially by neglecting percep-
tions of ethnic threat.
We build on these previous studies, trying to
improve them in several ways. To begin with, we
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use recent survey data from almost 13,000 respon-
dents in 15 European countries (Eurobarometer
Survey 47.1). These data were collected in 1997,
the year that social phenomena related to ethnic
exclusionism became more explicitly visible to the
public at large, not least because it was o¤cially
announced by the European Union as the year
against racism. Furthermore, we consider some of
the general theories in the ¢eld of ethnic exclu-
sionism from which we derive hypotheses more
systematically than has been done so far. We also
improve upon previous measurements at the
individual as well as the contextual level. Finally,
we perform multi-level analyses to test our
hypotheses adequately. The questions we set out
to answer are: to what extent can di¡erences in
support for ethnic exclusionism, i.e. opposition
to the granting of civil rights to legal migrants,
be explained in terms of (a) individual and (b) con-
textual characteristics, and of (c) interactions
between contextual and individual characteristics?
General Theories of Ethnic Exclusionism
In order to explain cross-national di¡erences in
unfavourable attitudes towards other ethnic groups,
we set out to explore twoparadigms thatwe consider
to be complementary ^ Realistic Con£ict Theory
and Social Identity Theory. Central to Realistic
Con£ictTheory is the proposition that competition
over scarce resources between social groups is the
catalyst of antagonistic inter-group attitudes. This
proposition has been underlined by two quite di¡er-
ent traditions, both dating back to the 1950s. Social
psychological experiments have shown that compe-
tition between groups improves solidarity within a
speci¢c group and increases hostility between
groups (Sherif and Sherif, 1969, 1979). Sociologists
have focused on societal causes of group con£icts
as well as on societal conditions under which these
con£icts arise. Coser (1956) claimed that each social
system is characterized by competition over scarce
resources (material resources, power, and status)
between social groups, such as ethnic groups.3 In
this theoretical tradition, Blalock (1967) made an
analytical distinction between, on the one hand,
actual competition and, on the other hand, per-
ceived competition. With actual competition he
referred to macro, or meso socio-economic condi-
tions, such as the availability of scarce resources and
market mechanisms regulating the distribution of
these scarce resources. Moreover, he suggested that
actual competition may also refer to a micro level,
i.e. competition between individuals from ethnic
groups who hold similar social positions, e.g. work
in similar niches of the labour market. Blalock pro-
posed that these actual competitive conditions
might a¡ect the majorities' perceptions of competi-
tion, that is, the subjectively perceived socio-
economic threat on the part of ethnic out-groups,
which in turn may induce hostile, unfavourable
stances toward these out-groups.4
Empirical studies have also shown that hostile,
unfavourable attitudes towards out-groups are often
strongly related to in-group favouritism (e.g.Adorno
etal.,1950/1982;5Levine andCampbell,1972;Brewer,
1986; Scheepers et al., 1990). This phenomenon, as
such, may be explained in terms of a second para-
digm we refer to ^ Social Identity Theory (Tajfel
and Turner, 1979; Tajfel, 1981, 1982; Turner, 1982).
According to this theory individuals have a funda-
mental need to perceive their in-group as superior
to ethnic out-groups. Consequently, they apply
favourable characteristics that they perceive among
members of the in-group to themselves via a mental
process labelled as s`ocial identi¢cation', and they
value out-groups negatively via mechanisms of
social contra-identi¢cation.We propose that under
competitive conditions, central to Realistic Con£ict
Theories, these processes may intensify. Therefore,
we consider Social Identity Theory to be comple-
mentary to propositions from Realistic Con£ict
Theory.6Werefer to the combinationof these propo-
sitions as Ethnic Competition Theory. This theory
can be summarized in a core proposition: competi-
tion, at an individual as well as at a contextual level,
may reinforce the mechanisms of social (contra-)
identi¢cation, the eventual outcome of which is
referred to as ethnic exclusionism. At the contextual
level, competition refers tomacro-social conditions.
At the individual level, competitionmaybe speci¢ed
in terms of social conditions of members of the
dominant group; and it may be speci¢ed in terms of
a perceived threat of competition that, we propose,
mediates the e¡ects of social conditions on ethnic
exclusionism. This speci¢cation implies a more
fully elaborated theoretical model.
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The distinction between actual and perceived
competition is often recognized in theoretical
terms (cf. Castles and Kosack, 1973; Kinder and
Sears, 1981; Hagendoorn and Janssen, 1983; Krauth
and Porst, 1984). However, this crucial theoretical
proposition is more often neglected in operational
terms, with some exceptions (cf. Be¨langer and
Pinard, 1991; Taylor, 1998). Let us refer to some
recent studies to underline this argument. Olzak
(1992) set out to explain the rate of ethnic collective
actions. Her ethnic competition theory boils down
to the argument that whenever ethnic threat arises,
whether it is due tomacro-social conditions (such as
large immigration £ows or economic contraction),
or meso-social conditions (lower ethnic segregation
in disadvantaged jobs or the breakdown of ethnic
enclaves), majority groups will react with exclusion-
ary measures.They do so because of perceptions of
threat (1992: 35). Obviously these perceptions are
considered to be the intervening factor that, unfor-
tunately, could not be measured. Quillian (1995,
1996) explicitly proposes that racial prejudice be
regarded as a response to perceived group threat,
the latter being measured by factors related to actual
competition, such as the relative size of the sub-
ordinate group relative to the dominant group or a
precarious economic situation (1995: 591, 1996:
820).7 But then he emphasizes that s`urveys to date
have not asked questions to measure perceived
threat from other racial groups . . . as an intervening
variable (1996:821).'8 This consequently implies that
a crucial part of ethnic competition theory has not
yet been tested.
From General Theories to Testable
Hypotheses on Ethnic Exclusionism
Individual Conditions
We use Ethnic Competition Theory to derive
hypotheses with regard to the e¡ects of individual
characteristics on ethnic exclusionism. It is to be
expected that the level of ethnic competition varies
between social categories.9 Those social categories
that hold similar social positions to ethnic minor-
ities, or those social categories whose members live
close to ethnic enclaves, may experience higher
levels of ethnic competition and therefore display
more widespread support for ethnic exclusionism.
In many European countries, the overwhelming
majority of non-indigenous ethnic residents are
located in the lower strata of society, very often
concentrated in urban areas.This means that lower-
strata members of the European majority popula-
tion who hold similar social positions to members
of ethnic minorities ^ that is, those with a low
educational level10 or a low income level, those per-
formingmanual labour, thosewho are unemployed,
or those who live in urban areas ^ will have to
compete with ethnic minorities more than other
citizens on average, for example in the labour
market.11 These actual competitive conditions
might reinforce the process of social (contra-)
identi¢cation, which may induce more widespread
support for ethnic exclusionism, particularly
among the social categories just mentioned. Hence,
we expect that:
(1) ethnic exclusionism will be strongly prevalent
among social categories of the dominant group
in similar social positions as social categories of
ethnic out-groups, more particularly among (1a)
people with a low level of education, (1b) manual
workers, (1c) unemployed people, (1d) people
with low income, (1e) people living in urban
areas.
Individual Perceptions
Ethnic competition theorists are likely to claim that
the e¡ects of individual characteristics on ethnic
exclusionism operate through perceptions of ethnic
threat, as we explained above. However, this crucial
part of Ethnic CompetitionTheory has hardly ever
been rigorously tested. Moreover, this view may be
controversial, since other theorists have derived
con£icting hypotheses from general propositions
of Realistic Con£ict Theory. In particular, the
symbolic racism researchers (Kinder and Sears,
1981; Sears and Kinder, 1985; Sears, 1988) have
opted for a rather narrow de¢nition of con£icting
ethnic interests: racial threat refers to real and
tangible threats that blacks pose to whites' personal
lives, i.e. to their short-term material interests.
Consequently, they have conceptualized con£icting
interests as a tangible personal risk (Bobo, 1988).
However, more often than not, these symbolic
racism researchers found quite moderate e¡ects of
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threatened personal interests on the implementation
of racial change.12 Yet we consider these views to be
valid.We will therefore include perceived threats to
personal interests as opposed to collective interests.
The hypotheses are that:
(2) ethnic exclusionism will be a¡ected by (2a) the
perception of collective ethnic threat and by
(2b) the perception of personal threat, i.e. dete-
riorating personal conditions.
Contextual Conditions
Ethnic CompetitionTheory o¡ers a straightforward
explanation concerning the e¡ects of societal
circumstances on exclusionistic reactions. Ethnic
exclusionism varies with (changes in the level of)
actual competition within countries. We propose
that the level of actual competition may be related
to conditions where there are (a) increasing numbers
of people competing for, ceteris paribus, approxi-
mately the same amount of scarce resources, or (b)
stable numbers of people competing for a decreas-
ing amount of scarce resources.13 These conditions
all imply, ceteris paribus, a stronger competition for
scarce resources between the dominant group and
ethnic out-groups. Following this rationale, also
suggested by Olzak (1992), Quillian (1995), and
Coenders and Scheepers (1998), we propose that:
(3) ethnic exclusionismwill be stronger in countries
where the actual level of ethnic competition is
relatively high, more particularly in contextual
conditions of (3a) a relatively high proportion
of non-EUcitizens, (3b) a relatively high number
of asylum seekers, (3c) a strong increase in the
relative number of asylum seekers, (3d) a high
rate of unemployment, and (3e) a large increase
in the level of unemployment.14
Interactions Between Individual and
Contextual Characteristics
Finally,we examinewhether the e¡ects of individual
characteristics on ethnic exclusionism vary within
di¡erent societal contexts. In fact, these cross-level
hypotheses, by their nature, involve combinations
of, on the one hand, the hypotheses on individual
characteristics and, on the other, hypotheses on con-
textual characteristics. Since this rationale provides
us with quite an extensive set of hypotheses, we will
state these hypotheses in more general terms. We
expect that the e¡ects of the individual characteris-
tics on ethnic exclusionism vary due to the level of
actual competition. Following this rationale and
building on the explications in previous sections,
we expect that:
(4) in countries with higher levels of actual competi-
tion, dominant group members in similar social
conditions as immigrants (such as manual work-
ers, theunemployed, etc.)will exhibitmore ethnic
exclusionism, when compared to countries with
lower levels of actual competition.
Figure 1 presents the structure of the explanation
followed.The numbers refer to the four hypotheses
that have been formulated in the paper.
Data and Measurement
Data
Wewill test our hypotheses using data derived from
the Eurobarometer 47.1 survey (Melich, 2000a),
which includes valid and presumably reliable data
for all the phenomena we want to describe and
explain, particularly on perceived threat, a measure-
ment that was missing in a previous version of the
Eurobarometer used by Quillian (1995). These
more recent data were collected in the spring of
1997 in 15 countries of the European Union using
face-to-face interviews with people aged 15 years
and over (total N12,728). The sample was drawn
according to a multi-stage random design. First,
so-called administrative regional units were drawn
to represent metropolitan, urban, and rural areas.
Secondly, within these units, a random starting
address was drawn and further addresses were
selected by random route procedures. Thirdly, at
each address, the actual respondentwas selected ran-
domly.The data were weighted according to known
national distributions for sex, age, and region. Since
we are interested in the level of ethnic exclusionism
of native-born respondents, we only included them
in the analyses. For further details of Eurobarometer
sampling methodology and survey design, see
European Commission (1997a, 1997b) and Melich
(2000b).
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Dependent Variable
Tomeasure the dependent variable ethnic exclusionism,
we selected a number of items included inTable 1on
the denial of civil rights to legally administered
immigrants.15 The response categories were `tend
to agree'versus`tend to disagree'.These items turned
out to be strongly statistically associated. Tests for
reliability, reported in Table A1, showed a range of
¢gures. The pooled Cronbach's alpha is 0.70. We
imputed missing values by means of the variable
that showed the strongest association with the
variable containing the missing score, for each
country separately, but only if respondents had no
more than three missing responses. We imputed
scores for about 3000 respondents, which were
about equally distributed over the 15 countries.
Independent Variables
To measure the ¢rst of our independent variables,
educational attainment, we used information on the
age at which the respondent had completed full-
time education.16 Income was measured with a
country-speci¢c question. Missing values were
imputed by the country-speci¢c mean value. To
enable cross-national comparisons, the income was
divided by the mean income of the speci¢c country
concerned. A measure ofsocial classwas constructed,
using the available information in these secondary
data, to resemble the cross-national comparable
categorization of Erikson, Goldthorpe and
Portocarero (1983). We distinguished a number of
categories, based on their actual social position in
the labour force: the service class (professionals,
proprietors, general managers, and junior
managers), routine non-manuals (people whose
employment involves sitting at a desk), self-
employed people (farmers, ¢shermen, and shop-
keepers), and manual workers (unskilled and skilled
workers as well as their supervisors).To these classes
we added as distinct categories the people whowere
temporarily not active in the labour force: unem-
ployed people, retired people, homemakers, and
students. Finally, we constructed a dummy variable
for people living in large cities to compare them
with people living in other areas. Previously, di¡er-
ences between di¡erent religious categories were
found (Gorsuch and Aleshire, 1974; Roof, 1974).
Therefore, we also included religion as a control vari-
able, distinguishing between non-religious people,
religious people belonging to non-Christian
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Figure 1. The structure ofthe explanation
denominations, and Christians. As other control
variables we included straightforward measures of
gender and age.
Mediating Variables
To measure the ¢rst of our mediating variables,
perceived ethnic threat, we selected a number of items
that clearly referred to ethnic minorities posing a
socio-economic or socio-cultural threat to the
majority. These items are also presented in Table 1.
Again, the response categories were `tend to agree'
versus`tend to disagree'.Tests for reliability, reported
inTableA1, were again quite satisfactory, Cronbach's
alpha ranging from 0.61 in Portugal to 0.83 in
France.
In some studies (Sears and Kinder, 1985; Bobo
and Hutchings, 1996) it has been suggested that
feelings of competitive threat do not di¡er sharply
from prejudice.17 In another study (Pettigrew and
Meertens, 1995) it was proposed that items measur-
ing ethnic threat as suchmaybe embedded in amore
general dimension of blatant prejudice. Both views
contradict our claim that perceived ethnic threat and
ethnic exclusionism are distinct. To test our claim,
we performed a principal factor analysis on both
sets of items simultaneously.Aswe onlyhave dichot-
omous items, therefore violating some of the
underlying assumptions of ordinary factor analysis,
we used tetrachoric inter-item correlations (calcu-
lated in PRELIS). Next, we tested a bi-factorial
solution on the pooled samples via LISREL.Table 2
shows that both measurements ^ ethnic exclusion-
ism and perceived ethnic threat ^ are factorially
distinct, with relatively high factor loadings on the
separate factors, providing us with evidence that
perceived collective ethnic threat may serve as a
separate intervening factor, distinct from ethnic
exclusionism.18 Eventually, a sum of scores was
computed for ethnic exclusionism and perceived
ethnic threat. Next, we computed the means and
standard deviations of both indices to gain an
insight into the cross-country di¡erences displayed
in Table 3. It turns out that some countries score
quite highlyon ethnic exclusionism ^ e.g. Belgium,
Germany, Austria, and Denmark ^ whereas coun-
tries like Spain, Ireland, and Finland have low
scores on this variable.
A second intervening variable refers to the
perceived threat of self-interest. We propose that this
phenomenon is indicated by personal unemploy-
ment risk, data for which was ascertained by the
straightforward question: `how likely is it that you
will lose your job in the years to come?'A second
related variable refers to status anxiety: a question
on the expectation that one's personal situation
may get worse in the course of the years to come.
We added a measure of subjective socio-economic
frustration: a simple question on the extent to
which respondents felt that their situation had
deteriorated over the last ¢ve years.
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Table 1. Indicators of ethnic exclusionism of legally established
immigrants and perceived ethnic threat
Ethnic exclusionism
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
q5401 Legally established immigrants from outside the
EuropeanUnion should have the same social
rights as the [NATIONALITY] citizens.
q5402 Legally established immigrants from outside the
EuropeanUnion should have the right to
bring members of their immediate family in
[OURCOUNTRY].
q5404 Legally established immigrants from outside the
EuropeanUnion should be sent back to their
country of origin if they are unemployed.
q5405 Legally established immigrants from outside the
EuropeanUnion should be all be sent back to
their country of origin.
q5406 Legally established immigrants from outside the
EuropeanUnion should be able to become
naturalised easily.
Perceived ethnic threat
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
q4901 In schools where there are too many children
from these minority groups, the quality of
education su¡ers.
q4903 People from these minority groups abuse the
system of social bene¢ts.
q4907 The religious practices of people from these
minority groups threaten our way of life.
q4910 The presence of people from these minority
groups is a cause of insecurity.
q4911 People from these minority groups are given
preferential treatment by the authorities.
q4915 The presence of people from these minority
groups increases unemployment in
[COUNTRY].
Since previous research has shown that post-mate-
rialism and a conservative political orientation may
also a¡ect attitudes towards out-groups (Fuchs, Ger-
hards and Roller, 1993), we included postmaterialism
and political orientation as controls. Postmaterialism
was constructed analogous to previous studies
(Inglehart, 1990): respondents had to rank four poli-
tical values, two materialistic, two postmaterialistic.
There was merely one item available for political
orientation, measured by the position respondents
gave themselves on a scale from 1 to 10, often
labelled as the left^right self-placement.
Contextual Variables
Contextual characteristics are presented inTable A2.
For all these characteristics we found direct, valid
statistics such as those on the proportion of non-
EU citizens; (changes in the in£ux of) asylum
seekers; and (changes in) unemployment rates.
Figures on the number of non-EU citizens as a per-
centage of the total population were taken from
Demographic Statistics publications of the European
Commission (1997). Figures on asylum-seekers
were taken from SOPEMI (1998), where trends in
international migration are registered. To adjust
these ¢gures for periodic and/or annual £uctua-
tions, we calculated the average in£ux of asylum
seekers in each country over the years 1994^6, i.e.
the years preceding the year in which the Euro-
barometer survey was conducted. Figures on
unemployment were derived from the StatisticalYear-
book ofthe UnitedNations (1995).19
Examining the international statistics presented
inTable A2, it becomes clear that substantial di¡er-
ences exist across Europe in the size of the
immigrant population. In Germany and Austria the
percentage of non-EUcitizens is highest, whereas in
Belgium, France, the Netherlands, and Sweden the
percentage is lower but still substantial. In countries
like Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and
Spain the percentage of non-EUcitizens is relatively
low. The same applies to the number of asylum
seekers. Countries like the Netherlands, Germany,
Sweden, Belgium, and Denmark receive many
asylum applications. Hardly any asylum seekers can
be found inFinland,Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal,
and Spain. However, in some of these countries
(Ireland and Portugal) the number of asylum seekers
has increased rapidly (seeTable A2).
Analyses andModel Testing
To test our hypotheses, we used multi-level analysis
that allows simultaneous modelling of individual-
level and country-level e¡ects and their interactions
(Bryk and Raudenbusch, 1992, Snijders and Bosker,
1999). To model these e¡ects we used the software
program ML-wiN (Goldstein, 1995). Multi-level
modelling enables the researcher to ascertain which
part of the variation in the individual dependent
variable is explained by country-level e¡ects, and
which part of the variance by individual-level
e¡ects. To explain di¡erences between countries in
ethnic exclusionism, the between-country variance
should be reduced (either by country-level e¡ects or
by compositional e¡ects of the individual-level
variables). As the structure of the data is such that
individuals are nested within countries (individuals
are level 1and countries level 2 units in the analysis),
neglecting the error terms at level 2 underestimates
the standard errors of the parameters. This in turn
could lead to incorrect con¢rmation of hypotheses.
We began by testing the models. Goodness-of-¢t
statistics for the di¡erent models are presented in
Table 4. Improvements in model ¢t are indicated by
the di¡erence in the loglikelihood statistic, which
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Table 2. Ethnic exclusionism and perceived ethnic threat:
LISREL factoranalysis on thepooled data-set of15 countriesa
Factor loadings (lambda coe¤cients)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Items Ethnic exclusionismPerceived ethnic threat












Note: Factor analysis of dichtomous items in LISREL by analysing tetra-
choric correlations. w2228.59with 25 degrees of freedom, RMSR0.032,
AGFI0.99, BICÿ52.27. Correlations between the error terms of the
items measuring the same latent construct are allowed.
follows a chi-square distribution with degrees of
freedom equal to the number of parameters to be
estimated.
We began by estimating a model including an
intercept with only individual-level variation. Next
we estimated amodel that also incorporates country-
level variation in the intercept (Model 1). This
improved the model ¢t signi¢cantly, indicating
that country-level variation in ethnic exclusionism
is substantial. This random intercept model can be
formally represented as:
Yij  b0jX0 (1)
with
b0j  b0  m0j  e0ij (2)
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Table 3. Means and standard deviations of ethnic exclusionism of legally established immigrants andperceived ethnic threat (N12,728)
Ethnic exclusionisma Perceived ethnic threatb N
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mean SD Mean SD
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Austria 2.30 1.80 2.96 1.93 791
Belgium 2.58 1.84 3.80 1.93 839
Denmark 2.21 1.43 3.78 1.84 864
Finland 1.38 1.41 1.96 1.83 866
France 1.90 1.81 3.13 2.17 834
Germany 2.41 1.75 2.95 1.88 1482
Greece 1.50 1.50 2.95 1.54 829
Ireland 1.14 1.31 1.79 1.69 693
Italy 1.69 1.50 2.03 1.80 828
Luxembourg 1.72 1.52 2.36 1.85 509
Netherlands 1.73 1.44 2.65 1.94 903
Portugal 1.60 1.33 2.78 1.72 712
Spain .91 1.26 1.95 1.72 768
Sweden 1.66 1.47 2.77 1.96 766
United Kingdom 1.85 1.61 2.87 2.00 1044
All countries 1.82 1.62 2.75 1.95 12728
aBased on a ¢ve-point scale.
bBased on a six-point scale.
Table 4. Di¡erentmulti-levelmodels of ethnic exclusionism in15European countries
Models ÿ2*loglikelihood D-2*loglikelihood Ddf
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
0 Intercept (individual-level variation) 48457
1 random variation at country level 47509 948 1
2 individual characteristics 46890 619 14
3 intermediate variables 43712 3178 6
4 country characteristics 43694 18 5
5a 4random slope for education 43687 7 2
5b 4random slope for manual worker 43682 12 2
5c 4random slope for unemployed 43693 1 2
5d 4random slope for income 43692 2 2
5e 4random slope for large city 43678 16 2
6b 5binteraction manual worker*
country characteristics 43677 5 5
6e 5einteraction large city*
country characteristics 43669 9 5
whereYij is the level of ethnic exclusionism for indi-
vidual i in country j. b0j is the intercept thatwe allow
to vary between countries and X0 is a constant. In
equation (2) the random term for the country level
(m0j) shows the deviation of the country-speci¢c
intercepts from the overall intercept (b0). The
random term e0ij shows the random variation at the
individual level.
Then, following the sequence of our hypotheses,
we included all independent individual character-
istics (like education and income) in our model
(Model 2). This model is summarized in equation
(3), where b1 is the coe¤cient estimated for the indi-
vidual variable Xij. The random intercept is
speci¢ed as in equation 2:
Yij  b0jX0  b1Xij (3)
We centred all individual-level variables (except for
the dummy variables) by the overall mean across all
countries. By including the individual variables in
themodelwe candetermine towhat extent composi-
tional di¡erences between countries explain
country-level variation in ethnic exclusionism.Table
4 shows a signi¢cant decrease of the loglikelihood.
Next,we added the intervening individual character-
istics in Model 3, which improved the model ¢t
strongly. To test the hypotheses on country-level
e¡ectswe subsequentlyentered contextual character-
istics into the multilevel model, still only allowing a
random intercept (Model 4):
Yij  b0jX0  b1Xij  b2Zj (4)
In this model b2 is the coe¤cient estimated for the
country-level variable Zj. The random intercept is
again speci¢ed as in equation 2. Including the
contextual variables as explanatory variables for the
variance in intercepts between countries resulted in
a signi¢cant decrease of the loglikelihood (Table 4).
Finally, we tested for cross-level interactions by
estimating random-slope models including inter-
action terms between country-level and individual-
level variables:
Yij  b0jX0  b1jXij  b2Zj  b3XijZij (5)
with
b1j  b1  m1j (6)
In this model, b1j is the coe¤cient estimated for the
individual variable Xij, which is allowed to vary
across countries j. Cross-level interactions (XijZij)
were added to the model. b3 is the estimated co-
e¤cient for such an interaction e¡ect. Equation (6)
shows how the slope of variable X varies across
countries, thus allowing for random variation (m1j)
in the individual-level e¡ects, i.e. the deviation of
the country-speci¢c slopes from the overall slope
(b1). Again the random intercept was speci¢ed in
the same way as in equation (2).
First, we investigated di¡erential e¡ects of indivi-
dual variables by allowing the speci¢c slopes to vary
across countries. However, it turned out that models
with more than two random slopes could not be
estimated with the ML-wiN program, probably due
to the small number of countries.Therefore, we ran
separate models each incorporating one random
slope only (Models 5a to 5e).20 Table 4 shows that
only the random slopes formanual worker and large city
increased the model ¢t considerably.21Consequently,
we investigatedwhether thevaryinge¡ectsof, respec-
tively, belonging to the category of manual workers
and living in large cities are related to the level of
actual competition in a country.Thus, we extended
model 5b by including cross-level interactions
betweenmanual worker and the contextual characteris-
ticsmeasuring actual competition (model 6b), andwe
extended model 5e by including cross-level interac-
tionswith living in large cities (model 6e).
Results
The E¡ects of Independent Individual
Characteristics on Ethnic Exclusionism
Table5presentsparameter estimates and, in the lower
part, variance components, ofmulti-level analyses to
explaindi¡erences in ethnic exclusionism.Model1in
Table 5 shows that the variance between countries
(0.19) is much smaller than the variance between
individuals within countries (2.44). To test our
hypotheses regarding di¡erences in ethnic exclu-
sionism between social categories (hypothesis 1), we
included the independent individual characteristics
in our model (Model 2). It turned out that ethnic
exclusionism is indeed strongly supported by people
with a low level of education: the lower the level of
educational attainment, thehigher the levelof ethnic
exclusionism, which has been found in previous
research timeandagain (cf.Vogt,1997).Furthermore,
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Table 5. Parameter estimates from multi-level models on ethnic exclusionism of legally established immigrants in 15 European countries;
standard errors in brackets (N12,728)
Ethnic exclusionism
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 6b Model 6e
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Intercept 1.77(0.11) 1.42(0.13) 1.67(0.09) 1.68(0.06) 1.69(0.06) 1.69(0.06)
Individual characteristics
Education ÿ0.05(0.00) ÿ0.02(0.00) ÿ0.02(0.00) ÿ0.02(0.00) ÿ0.02(0.00)
Service class (ref.)
Manual worker 0.32(0.06) 0.12(0.05) 0.12(0.05) 0.11(0.06) 0.12(0.05)
Routine non-manual 0.16(0.05) 0.06(0.05) 0.06(0.05) 0.06(0.05) 0.05(0.05)
Petty bourgeois 0.34(0.07) 0.13(0.06) 0.13(0.06) 0.13(0.06) 0.13(0.06)
Housewife 0.33(0.06) 0.16(0.06) 0.17(0.06) 0.16(0.06) 0.16(0.06)
Student ÿ0.10(0.06) ÿ0.08(0.06) ÿ0.08(0.06) ÿ0.09(0.06) ÿ0.08(0.06)
Unemployed 0.23(0.07) 0.13(0.06) 0.14(0.06) 0.13(0.06) 0.14(0.06)
Retired 0.32(0.06) 0.15(0.06) 0.15(0.06) 0.15(0.06) 0.16(0.06)
Income ÿ0.10(0.04) ÿ0.07(0.03) ÿ0.07(0.03) ÿ0.07(0.03) ÿ0.07(0.03)
Large City ÿ0.07(0.03) ÿ0.04(0.03) ÿ0.04(0.03) ÿ0.04(0.03) ÿ0.04(0.04)
Male 0.11(0.03) 0.04(0.03) 0.04(0.03) 0.04(0.03) 0.04(0.03)
Age 0.00(0.00) ÿ0.00(0.00) ÿ0.00(0.00) ÿ0.00(0.00) ÿ0.00(0.00)
No religion (ref.)
Christian 0.19(0.04) 0.06(0.03) 0.06(0.03) 0.06(0.03) 0.06(0.03)
Non-Christian ÿ0.07(0.08) ÿ0.11(0.07) ÿ0.12(0.07) ÿ0.10(0.07) ÿ0.14(0.07)
Intermediate variables
Perceived ethnic threat 0.36(0.01) 0.36(0.01) 0.36(0.01) 0.36(0.01)
Socio-economic frustration 0.06(0.02) 0.06(0.02) 0.06(0.02) 0.06(0.02)
Status anxiety 0.11(0.02) 0.11(0.02) 0.11(0.02) 0.11(0.02)
Chance of losing job 0.02(0.02) 0.02(0.02) 0.02(0.02) 0.02(0.02)
Postmaterialism ÿ0.18(0.02) ÿ0.18(0.02) ÿ0.18(0.02) ÿ0.18(0.02)
Left-right self placement 0.07(0.01) 0.07(0.01) 0.07(0.01) 0.07(0.01)
Country characteristics
%Non-EU citizens 0.10(0.03) 0.09(0.04) 0.11(0.04)
Number of asylum seekers: 1995 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.00)
Change in no. of asylum seekers: 1990^5 ÿ0.01(0.01) ÿ0.01(0.01) ÿ0.01(0.02)
Unemployment: 1995 ÿ0.01(0.01) ÿ0.01(0.01) ÿ0.01(0.01)




Change asylum seekers*Worker 0.00(0.02)
Unemployment*Worker 0.01(0.01)
Change unemployment*Worker ÿ0.01(0.04)
Non-EU citizens*Large city ÿ0.02(0.03)
Asylum seekers*Large city ÿ0.00(0.00)
Change asylum seekers*Large city ÿ0.03(0.02)
Unemployment*Large city 0.02(0.01)
Change unemployment*Large city ÿ0.02(0.03)
Variance components
Individual 2.44 2.32 1.81 1.81
(% explained compared to
Intercept Model) (5) (26) (26)
Country 0.19 0.22 0.08 0.02
(% explained compared to
Intercept Model) (0) (58) (89)
Note: Bold parameters indicate signi¢cance at p50.05.
we found thatmanualworkers (0.32) aswell as unem-
ployed people (0.23) are substantially more in favour
of ethnic exclusionism than people belonging to the
service class. Regarding income, we found a minor,
but statistically signi¢cant, e¡ect consistentwith our
hypothesis: the lower one's income, the more one
favours ethnic exclusionism. However, we had to
refute our hypothesis regarding people living in
large cities. It turned out that theywere less likely to
exclude ethnic minorities than people living
elsewhere.
Overall, these ¢ndings largely corroborate our
expectation that ethnic exclusionism will be more
prevalent among social categories in similar social
positions as ethnic out-groups in terms of educa-
tion, social class, and income. Moreover, we found
a number of other categories of people who were
rather strongly inclined to exclude ethnic minori-
ties: routine non-manuals, the petty bourgeoisie,
housekeepers, and retired people support ethnic
exclusionism more than the service class does; men
do more than women; and Christians do more than
the non-religious. The variance components in
Table 5 show that by including the independent
individual variables, the variance between indivi-
duals has dropped slightly from 2.44 to 2.32. The
variance between countries did not decrease. This
implies that di¡erences between countries in the
average level of ethnic exclusionism cannot be
attributed, at least not predominantly, to di¡erences
in population composition.
The E¡ects of Mediating Individual
Perceptions on Ethnic Exclusionism
In the next step, we included all intervening indivi-
dual variables (hypothesis 2) in order to explainwhy
people in particular social conditions are more likely
to support ethnic exclusionism than others. Model 3
in Table 5 shows that most e¡ects of independent
individual characteristics were strongly reduced as
compared to Model 2. This implies that the inter-
vening variables to a large extent explain di¡er-
ences between social categories in ethnic
exclusionism. The parameter estimates with their
standard errors show that the perception of ethnic
threat is the most important predictor (0.36),
whereas the e¡ects of perceptions of personal threat
are less strong. Socio-economic frustration (0.06)
and status anxiety (0.11) are, as expected, positively
related to ethnic exclusionism, but the e¡ect of
personal unemployment risk is not signi¢cant.
Moreover, ethnic exclusionism is more strongly
prevalent among individuals with a materialistic
value orientation and a conservative political orien-
tation (seeTable 5).22
The variance components for Model 3 show that
the variances between individuals within countries
as well as between countries have dropped consider-
ably. By including independent and intervening
individual characteristics, 26 per cent of the original
amount of variance between individuals within
countries (see Model 1) could be explained. In
addition, the variance between countries decreased
sharply following the inclusion of intervening
individual characteristics: 58 per cent of the original
variance between countries could be explained.
The E¡ects of Contextual Characteristics on
Ethnic Exclusionism
Next we turn to the relation between national char-
acteristics and ethnic exclusionism.The expectation
was that ethnic exclusionism would be stronger in
countries with a high level of actual competition
(hypothesis 3).Model 4 inTable 5 presents parameter
estimates for the e¡ects of contextual characteristics
(together with all individual-level variables). As
expected, we found that the larger the proportion
of non-EU citizens living in a country, the more
people are in favour of ethnic exclusionism (0.10).
However, contrary to our hypothesis, the number
of asylum seekers, as well as changes over time in
the in£ux of asylum seekers, are not related to ethnic
exclusionism. Moreover, it turned out that the level
of unemployment as such is not related to ethnic
exclusionism, nor does the change in unemploy-
ment have an e¡ect.23 These last ¢ndings may be
due to the relatively small number of countries
included in the analysis with, moreover, minor
variances at the contextual level.
The E¡ects of Cross-Level Interactions on
Ethnic Exclusionism
Finally, we investigate whether the e¡ects of indivi-
dual characteristics vary across countries. We
expected that the higher the level of actual competi-
tion in a country, the stronger the e¡ects of
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individual characteristics (like education and unem-
ployment) on ethnic exclusionism (hypothesis 4).
Building particularly on the ¢ndings of Models 5b
and 5e in Table 4, we set out to test, in Model 6b,
whether di¡erences between manual workers (as
compared to the service class) and, in Model 6e,
whether di¡erences between people living in urban
areas (as compared to those not living in cities),
depend on the amount of actual competition at the
national level. It turned out that the more non-EU
citizens were present in a country, the more manual
workers were inclined to support ethnic exclusion-
ism, which is in accordance with our expectation.
However, none of the other cross-level interactions
reached signi¢cance.
Advantages of Multi-Level Analysis
The main question in this paper was how cross-
national variation in ethnic exclusionism could be
explained. It turned out that, ¢rst of all, variations
in the composition of the population, not in the
independent but in the intervening individual char-
acteristics, accounted for cross-national di¡erences
(composition e¡ects). Moreover, inclusion of
contextual characteristics decreased the variance
between countries evenmore strongly, so that, even-
tually, almost all of the original country-level
variance was explained.This is further illustrated in
Figure 2, which displays the residuals for the 15
countries in three of our models.
The residuals of Model 1 correspond with the
observed di¡erences in ethnic exclusionism between
the countries as presented inTable 3. By including all
individual characteristics (both the independent and
interveningvariables), the country-level residuals are
considerably reduced. By also including country-
level variables, the residuals are again reduced. By
comparing the residuals of the di¡erent models,
one can ascertain how much is to be gained by
including individual respectively contextual charac-
teristics: in this case quite a lot.
The residuals for separate countries illustrate our
models. For instance, ethnic exclusionism in
Germany was quite high (see also Table 3). In
Figure 2 we see that this high average is only to a
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Figure 2. Country-level residuals in ethnic exclusionism
small extent the outcome of the speci¢c compo-
sition of the German population, and more due to
the outcome of the contextual characteristics of
Germany, in particular the high proportion of non-
EU citizens (see also Table A2). Likewise, the low
level of ethnic exclusionism in Ireland and Spain
stems from their population composition (especially
the low level of perceived ethnic threat) as well as
their speci¢c national context, in particular the
small number of non-EU citizens in both countries
(see alsoTable A2).
Conclusion and Discussion
In this paper we set out to explainEuropean citizens'
opposition to the granting of civil rights to legally
administered resident migrants.The fact that people
wish to deny civil rights to legal migrants already
living in the country seems more serious than any
other aspect of ethnic exclusionism, because the
mere social presence of ethnic groups is marginal-
ized if one denies these minorities civil rights.
In order to explain this phenomenonwe explored
Ethnic Competition Theory. The core proposition
that we set out to test was that actual competition
between ethnic groups, at an individual and contex-
tual level, induces ethnic exclusionism.We proposed
that actual as well as perceived competition might
operate, at the individual level, to reinforce ethnic
exclusionism.We found thatmany researchers recog-
nize this theoretical proposition, however, they
unfortunately neglected to include it in their
measurements and consequently in their models.
Taking this general proposition seriously led us,
¢rst, to distinguish between individual and
contextual competitive conditions; secondly, to
conceptualize and operationalize actual ethnic
competition distinctively from the perception of
ethnic threat; and, thirdly, to model perceived
ethnic threat as a mediating factor to explain the
relationship between, on the one hand, competitive
inter-ethnic conditions and, on the other, support
for ethnic exclusionism.
Regarding inter-ethnic competition at an indivi-
dual level we found that indigenous people who
hold similar social positions to ethnic minorities
support ethnic exclusionism more strongly. Indeed,
ethnic exclusionism is more strongly supported by
less-educated and lower-income groups, as well as
bymanual workers andunemployed people.Regard-
ing contextual competitive conditionswe found that
the larger the proportion of non-EU citizens in a
country, the stronger the support for ethnic exclu-
sionism. We also found an important interaction
between individual and contextual competitive
conditions: the larger the percentage of non-EU
citizens in a country, the more manual workers are
in favour of ethnic exclusionism as compared to the
service class. These ¢ndings are all in line with
Ethnic Competition Theory. However, we found
that residence in a large city does not evoke
exclusionistic reactions.
Perceived ethnic threat turned out to be the most
important predictor of di¡erences in ethnic exclu-
sionism: the more ethnic out-groups are perceived
as a collective threat, the stronger the opposition to
the granting of civil rights to legal migrants. More-
over, perceived ethnic threat explained di¡erences
between social categories in exclusionistic reactions
to a large extent. These ¢ndings corroborate and
specify Ethnic CompetitionTheory at an individual
level. Our measure of perceived ethnic threat indi-
cates to what extent ethnic minorities are perceived
as a collective threat to the majority. Unfortunately,
we lacked a valid measure of the perceptions of
respondents that ethnic minorities pose a personal
threat to them. However, the relative importance of
our measure of perceived ethnic threat compared
to other factors measuring (fear of) deteriorating
personal conditions suggests that unfavourable atti-
tudes towards ethnic out-groups are more strongly
a¡ected by feelings of collective ethnic threat than
by feelings of personal threat, which we consider
consistent with previous ¢ndings and interpreta-
tions (Bobo, 1983, 1988).
In many previous studies the perception of ethnic
threat was proposed as the crucial mediating link
between social conditions and aspects of ethnic
exclusionism, but it has hardly ever been tested
empirically. Eventually, Quillian (1995) claimed
that including more direct measures of perceived
threat would contribute to our understanding of
prejudice, or more generally of ethnic exclusionism.
In this contribution we have shown that:
^ perceived ethnic threat is both theoretically and
empirically distinct from, but nevertheless
strongly related to ethnic exclusionism;
ETHNIC EXCLUSIONISM IN EUROPEANCOUNTRIES 29
^ perceptions of ethnic threat do indeed intervene
e¡ects in the impact of people's social conditions
at the individual level on ethnic exclusionism;
and
^ actual inter-ethnic competition at the national
level does a¡ect ethnic exclusionism.
However, our paper has not taken into account the
various sources of actual and perceived threat.At the
contextual level, we failed to come to grips with
non-socio-economic sources of competition, such
as those stemming from cultural or historical
conditions. E¡orts to include these conditions run
the risk of having no valid comparative contextual
data to model their e¡ects appropriately. None the
less we feel that our empirical evidence corroborates
and, moreover, adds insights to a rather general
proposition explicated by Olzak (1992): rising
competition, actual competition as well as percep-
tions of competition, drive dominant social groups
towards ethnic exclusionism, be it in the form of
restrictions on immigration or restrictions on the
ability to live freely in a country resulting from the
denial of civil rights to legal migrants.
Notes
1. The group of legally administered resident migrants
obviously consists of di¡erent immigrant groups with
di¡erent migration as well as integration histories
(c.f., Pettigrew, 1998). However, they have one impor-
tant thing in common: they work and live legally in
the European country they migrated to, whereas
asylum seekers are still in the process of acquiring a
legal status.
2. This political issue was initially only discussed by the
political leaders of extreme right-wing parties in
European nations. It was, however, soon picked up
by the political leaders of conservative and liberal
parties.
3. Although Coser did not actually refer to ethnic
groups, it is clear that this general proposition may
include competition between all types of social
groups.
4. This argument was explicated in a similar fashion by
Bobo (1988), building on Blumer (1958), proposing a
relationship between e`xternal threat' and `perceived
threat' to explain opposition to racial policies.
5. In the line of research following Adorno et al. (1950/
1982) the main argument is that ethnocentrismmaybe
explained in terms of personality characteristics. In
spite of many critiques, basic propositions along
these lines have not been refuted empirically (cf.
Scheepers et al., 1990). In this contribution we will
leave this argument aside,mainly for practical reasons:
there are no valid measurements available.
6. This elaboration is considered to be odd by some (e.g.
Forbes, 1997), but is underlined by others (Brown,
1995; Jones, 1997). In the early 1970s it was found that
some levelof in-group favouritism exists even inmini-
mal (experimental) conditions, i.e. in conditions of
r`andom'social categorization (Tajfel et al., 1971;Tajfel,
1981).This implies that there is some level of in-group
favouritism, even without any actual or perceived
competitive conditions.RealisticCon£ictTheory pro-
poses that actual competition between ethnic groups
may reinforce both in-group favouritism and out-
group hostility, i.e. ethnocentrism.
7. Quillian actually emphasizes this conceptual distinc-
tion between racial prejudice on the one hand and
perceived group threat on the other hand. He makes
a very clear statement in this respect: (1995: 592) `it is
the collective feeling that the dominant group is
threatened that leads to prejudice.' Moreover, in his
¢rst hypothesis, he states that `prejudice is a function
of the perceived threat the subordinate group poses to
the dominant group' which clearly implies this dis-
tinction: the former variable is the dependent and
the latter is the independent or intermediate variable.
Quillian also emphasizes the conceptual distinction
between the actual contextual conditions that may
induce perceived ethnic threat when he states (1995:
592) that `perceived threat is in£uenced both by the
economic situation and by the size of the subordinate
group'. However, this crucial part of the theoretical
analysis was not elaborated upon in the empirical
analysis.
8. However, Taylor (1998) employs some items to mea-
sure perceived economic and political threat, using
the 1990 General Social Survey. Moreover, some of
the itemsQuillian (1995: 593) uses, maybe considered
to be measurements of perceived ethnic threat, like:
`they exploit social security bene¢ts' and `their pre-
sence is one of the causes of delinquency and
violence', i.e. items that express that some collective
goods, like welfare and order, are being threatened
by ethnic minorities.
9. Here we follow the distinctions made byTajfel (1982)
between a social category, a collectivity, and a social
group. A social category is an entity of people
distinguishable by some external characteristic, like
educational level. If they are aware of this joint exter-
nal characteristic, the people of the entity are labelled
as a collectivity. And if the people, moreover, attach
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value to their collectivity, they are said to constitute a
social group.
10. Several distinct mechanisms, other than the one we
propose, might be responsible for the relation
between low education and ethnic exclusionism (for
an overview, see Vogt, 1997). However, the focus is
not on these mechanisms as such.
11. According toDiez-Medrano (1994) ethnic exclusion-
ism may also be caused by inter-group segmentation.
However, aswe do not have directmeasures of ethnic
labour-market segmentation in our data we are not
able to test this hypothesis.
12. Therefore, they resorted to symbolic racism that they
considered a stronger predictor of whites' responses
to ethno-political issues than old-fashioned racism
or personal threats (for an overview see Sears, 1988).
Since, particularly, the measurement of symbolic
racism has been severely criticized (Sniderman and
Tetlock, 1986; see Sears, 1988, for a reply), we did
not take it into account.
13. Olzak (1992) has suggested that the level of actual
competition may also be related to conditions of
increasing numbers of people competing for a
decreasing amount of scarce resources. However,
since these conditions do not prevail in the 1990s in
Europe (cf. Table A2), we will not test this hypoth-
esis.
14. In the same vein, it could be argued that ethnic
exclusionism is likely to be widespread in countries
with decreasing levels of GDP, as was proposed by
Quillian (1995). However, since the European coun-
tries under consideration do not su¡er from such
deteriorating economic conditions, this hypothesis
is considered un¢t for the European context. More-
over, a number of other actual contextual conditions
possibly related to perceived ethnic threat could be
spelled out.We refer to contextual conditions at the
meso-level as mentioned byOlzak (1992), or to other
contextual conditions indicating actual competition
but not necessarily related to socio-economic condi-
tions, such as changes in political power or changes
in the dominant values. However, since we have
become aware of the lack of cross-national compar-
able data, wewill not follow up this line of reasoning.
Recently, complementary hypotheses on ethnic
exclusionism have been suggested fromquite a di¡er-
ent angle.Thraenhardt (1995) argues that particularly
conservative governments, ormore generally conser-
vative politicians, have paved the way for more
widespread ethnic exclusionism. That is why these
politicians have approved of restrictions on immigra-
tion and citizenship for ethnic minorities. However,
testing whether exposure to particular governments
increases ethnic exclusionism requires rather speci¢c
measurements relating to the knowledge of govern-
ment policies that are unfortunately not available, or
rather general measurements of exposure to these
governmental policies (such as the percentage of con-
servatives in government or in any other democratic
institution) which are only valid on the quite crude
assumption that all the inhabitants of a country have
been exposed to this political context equally.
15. Unfortunately the data do not allow us to distinguish
between di¡erent immigrant groups. We acknow-
ledge that Europeans' exclusionistic reactions could
vary by immigrants' ethnicity or country of origin.
However, for the issue at hand, i.e. to be able to
compare exclusionistic reactions cross-nationally,
the only option is to consider immigrants as an
undi¡erentiated whole.
16. To compute the number of years the respondent had
enjoyed educational training, we subtracted 6 years,
i.e. the age at which formal education starts in most
European countries.We prefer this procedure to that
used by Quillian (1995: 595), who divided educa-
tional level into two categories, thereby `wasting'
variance.The same holds true for variables like social
class and income that Quillian dichotomized into
two categories.
17. Of course, one may argue that operational di¡er-
ences are not precise, since perceptions of ethnic
threat may also be considered to be prejudices.We
believe, however, that there are major conceptual
and operational di¡erences between both sets of
items. The most important one is that there is no
implicit or explicit reference to ethnic threat in the
items on `the denial of civil rights to immigrants',
whereas this ethnic threat is implied quite explicitly
in each of the items measuring `perceived ethnic
threat'.Therefore, we consider both sets of measure-
ments to be valid for the purposes at hand.
18. Although the ¢t of this bi-factorial model, judged by
w2 (228, df25) is rather poor, its ¢t is much better
than the ¢t of a one-factorial model (w2355,
df26).We emphasize that this poor ¢t is, at least
partly, due to the large sample size we employ: sepa-
rate analyses per country did show quite acceptable
chi-squares. Another ¢t measure not sensitive to the
sample size, like theAdjustedGoodness of Fit Index,
is very high (0.99 on a scale from 0 to1).The Bayesian
Information Criterion (BICw2ÿdf*ln(n*k)), pro-
posed by Raftery (1993) is negative, also indicating
that the model ¢ts the data well. Furthermore, the
modi¢cation indices indicated merely minor cross-
loadings, providing additional evidence that the
exclusion and threat items are factorially distinct,
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both on the pooled and on the separate sub-samples.
Final evidence for the empirical distinction between
these items is that there was hardly any tendency by
respondents to give straight-line answers. Moreover,
each response set contained response-set breakers.
19. Collinearity diagnostics show that there is no sign of
multicollinearity between the contextual variables.
20. Including a random slope in a model is associated
with a loss of 2 degrees of freedom: one parameter
for the variance in random slope and one parameter
for the covariance between random intercept and
random slope.Together with the variance for the ran-
dom intercept, such a model has three (co-)variance
parameters at the second level. The variance at the
second level can therefore no longer be displayed in
a single ¢gure. That is why we did not report the
variance components for the random slope models
inTable 5.
21. A randomslope for education led to a signi¢cant, but
very minor decrease in loglikelihood. However,
inspection of the parameter estimates associated
with the random slope (i.e. the variance in random
slope and the covariance between random slope and
random intercept) showed that both parameters are
close to zero and not signi¢cant at the 5%-level.We
therefore concluded that the e¡ect of education does
not substantively vary across countries, at least not
across this sample of countries.
22. Additional analyses including individual character-
istics and perceived threat alone result in similar
parameter estimates: the e¡ect of perceived threat is
0.38 instead of 0.36, and the e¡ects of individual
characteristics remain highly similar.
23. Although the e¡ects of (change in) unemployment
were non-signi¢cant, we looked more closely at the
negative nature of these e¡ects.Visual inspection of
the bivariate relationships showed that this result
could be strongly a¡ected by outliers. Whereas the
unemployment rate in Finland and Spain was extre-
mely high in 1995 compared to the other countries,
the support for ethnic exclusionismwas relatively low
in both countries; and whereas the rise of unemploy-
ment was extremely high in Sweden and Finland, the
support for ethnic exclusionism was quite low in
these countries; and whereas the change, i.e. the
increase, in the number of asylum seekers was extre-
melyhigh in Ireland, support for ethnic exclusionism
was quite low. Given the rather small number of
available countries, our results for country character-
istics are sensitive to in£uential level-2 cases, that is,
countries with an exceptionally high or low score on
a speci¢c country characteristic. Therefore, we
decided to test for the stability of our ¢nal estimates
by successively eliminating outliers (i.e., Finland,
Spain, Ireland, and Sweden). It turned out that the
e¡ect of unemployment, although it switched from
negative to positive, remained non-signi¢cant. The
other contextual e¡ects (the change in the number
of asylum seekers and change in the level of unem-
ployment) remained negative and non-signi¢cant.
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United Kingdom 0.70 0.77
All Countries 0.70 0.74
Table A2. Country characteristics: migration patterns and socio-













. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Austria 5.98 74.78 0.24 6.6 1.22
Belgium 3.65 126.80 1.04 9.3 1.29
Denmark 2.92 111.32 1.20 10.3 1.06
Finland 0.96 15.03 0.45 17.4 5.12
France 4.02 36.67 0.38 11.6 1.30
Germany 6.39 148.30 0.62 12.9 1.79
Greece 1.05 13.65 0.32 10.0 1.43
Ireland 0.64 18.52 12.96 12.2 0.95
Italy 0.98 2.43 0.11 11.1 1.01
Luxembourg 3.12 58.33 1.69 2.7 2.08
Netherlands 3.66 223.93 1.79 7.1 0.95
Portugal 1.19 5.39 4.00 5.5 1.17
Spain 0.62 19.05 1.07 22.9 1.40
Sweden 4.05 125.09 0.37 7.7 4.81
United Kingdom 2.06 76.47 1.03 8.5 1.27
aPercentage of non-EU citizens in 1995 (related to the total population); data from
European Commision,Demographic Statistics 1997.
bNumber of asylum seekers per 100.000 inhabitants in 1995 (to correct for yearly £uctua-
tionstheaveragehasbeentakenof thenumberofasylumseekers intheyears1994,1995,and
1996); data fromSOPEMI,Trends inInternationalMigration, Annual Report,1998 edition.
cChange in the number of asylum seekers from1990 to1995 (as the ratio of the average of
the number of asylum seekers in 1994, 1995, and 1996 to the average in 1989, 1990, and
1991); data from SOPEMI,Trends in InternationalMigration, Annual Report, 1998 edition.
dTotal unemployment rate in 1995; data from Statistical Yearbook ofthe UnitedNations 1995.
e Change in unemployment rate from 1990 to 1995 (the ratio of the unemployment rate
in 1995 to the unemployment rate in 1990 ^ Germany 1991 to 1995, Italy 1990 to 1994,
Portugal 1990 to 1993); data from Statistical Yearbook ofthe UnitedNations 1995.
